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Abstract:  
 
Cooperation among local governments has been encouraged to enable the aggregation of resources 
and improved public sector efficiency. However, if cooperation through the joint delivery of local 
public services is likely to be welfare enhancing for the agglomeration, but will lead to losses for 
one of the parties, it is unlikely that the losing municipality will cooperate. Using a unique panel 
                                                 
1 Acknowledgments: We are grateful for the many helpful comments and suggestions from Jan Brueckner, Benny Geys, 
Teemu Lyytikainen, Franco Peracchi and Federico Revelli. 
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dataset of 30,000 French municipalities for 1995-2003, we estimate the relationship between 
cooperation decision and the fiscal revenues raised to provide local public goods. We employ a new 
econometric strategy based on Lee (1978), developing a non linear method controlling for fixed 
effect, endogenous covariates and cluster standard error. We find evidence that a positive difference 
between the expected fiscal revenues of a cooperating locality and the actual revenues realized by 
an isolated locality significantly increases the probability of joining an inter-municipal community.  
 
Keywords: inter-municipal cooperation, fiscal revenues, bivariate response variable, panel data, 
endogeneity 
JEL codes: C3, H2, H4, H7 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Inter-municipal cooperation is a current phenomenon in Western European countries (Hulst et al., 
2009). The OECD (2006, p. 25) notes that “Inter-municipal cooperation has been and remains an 
important element of most national programmes.” For example, Austria and Sweden in the 1950s, 
Germany and Belgium in the 1970s and more recently, Switzerland, Greece and Denmark have 
been encouraging their sub-national jurisdictions to cooperate. The first experience of inter-
governmental cooperation in France involving municipalities administering some local public 
services, dates back to 1890. However, there is a variety of institutional arrangements for 
cooperation providing for the joint delivery of local public services, ranging from simple (or 
functional) cooperative agreements between independent municipalities, to complete mergers or 
amalgamations.  
 
 Issues related to consolidations of states and jurisdictions have been debated by economic 
theorists (see e.g. Blume and Blume, 2007, which provides a review of the pros and cons of local 
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authority mergers). The joint provision of public goods by communities (i.e. groups of 
municipalities) is likely to create economies of scale and thus to offer more possibilities for cutting 
costs. However there is a trade-off between the achievement of economies of scale that provide 
incentives for consolidation, and respect for local heterogeneity in preferences (as pioneered by 
Tiebout, 1956) which tends to favor separation. Several papers including Miceli (1993) and 
Spolaore (2004) analyze the optimal size of coalitions. Cooperation is also justified on the grounds 
of internalizing inter-jurisdictional spillovers (see e.g. Bradford and Oates, 1974): the benefits of 
public expenditure (infrastructure, road building, cultural facilities…) often spread beyond the 
boundaries of the supplying jurisdiction and affect the welfare of the citizens in neighboring 
localities. Hoyt (1991) shows that consolidation can be an efficient policy corrective for the 
undersupply of local public goods generated by tax competition among local jurisdictions. He 
demonstrates that limiting competition by reducing the number of the localities in a metropolis 
increases tax rates and welfare. Finally, based on comparative research on eight European countries, 
Hulst et al. (2009) argue that increased production scale, urbanization and market pressure tend to 
favor the development of cooperative arrangements. Globalization puts pressure on local authorities 
to become more competitive by creating larger spatial units, and the financial crisis has provided a 
huge incentive to seek economies of scale in the provision of local public goods. 
 
Despite frequent claims that cooperation among local governments is a potential solution to 
inefficiencies, there are few studies on its determinants.2 To our knowledge, the related empirical 
literature is quite recent and is concerned mainly with the characteristics of optimal coalitions - such 
as school districts - in the US context (Brasington, 1999, 2003a, 2003b; Gordon and Knight, 2009). 
Weese (2011) uses political coalition formation games to explain mergers between Japanese 
municipalities. Saarima and Tukiainen (2010) investigate the political decision making process 
                                                 
2 Also, to our knowledge, very few papers focus on the consequences of cooperation on expenditure. However see for 
Israel (Reingewertz, 2012), Italy (Ermini and Santolini, 2010), and France (Frere et al., 2012). 
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behind coalitions in Finland. Also for Finland, Sorensen (2006) shows the impact of political 
transaction costs on voluntary local government mergers. He identifies the role of state grants, 
revenue disparities and expected changes to party strengths after unification, on the process of 
merging. However, these empirical papers investigate extreme cases of cooperation since they 
analyze local mergers (i.e. new jurisdictions in which former members disappear).3 To our 
knowledge, there has been no published theoretical or empirical work on the determinants of inter-
municipal cooperation arrangements (or functional cooperation) aimed at the joint delivery of 
public services.  
 
The objective of this paper is to contribute by analyzing the determinants of inter-municipal 
cooperation using the French experience, where “functional” cooperation (but not mergers) between 
municipalities is decided voluntarily by municipal councils, to provide joint public goods. Our 
hypothesis is that the formation of this type of cooperating community can be analyzed using the 
concepts and tool of cooperative game theory. Bottom-up cooperation through horizontal 
negotiations among neighboring local authorities can produce situations where all partners win. 
Where cooperation is welfare enhancing for the whole agglomeration but leads to losses for one 
municipality it is unlikely that this authority will agree to cooperate. As far as we know this 
approach is novel in local public finance.  
 
The main empirical contribution of this paper is that it exploits the characteristics of the 
French institutional setting to test the impact of fiscal revenues on the probability to cooperate. For 
many years and especially since 1999, the French government has favored the creation of inter-
municipal jurisdictions based on large state grants, to solve the problem of “municipal 
fragmentation” in France.4 Inter-municipalities are groupings of several municipalities to enable 
                                                 
3 See also Moisio (2012) on mergers in Northern European countries. 
4 In 2010 there were some 36,500 French municipalities, i.e. nearly half of all European (EU15) municipalities. 87% of 
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collective financing and management of some local public services. Currently, most French 
municipalities (more than 90% in 2010) are grouped within larger jurisdictions (known as 
‘Etablissements Publics de Coopération Intercommunale’ or EPCI). Like French municipalities, 
EPCI have high levels of autonomy to set their own local tax rates. 
 
 Econometric modeling of the determinants of cooperation can be complicated because fiscal 
revenues and cooperation decision in practice are simultaneous. We can expect municipalities to 
consider their expected fiscal revenues when joining an inter-municipal agreement, while fiscal 
revenues within a locality depend on local intergovernmental agreements. To address this problem 
of simultaneity (or reciprocal causation) as well as other econometric issues related to the economic 
setting, we propose a new applied econometric strategy based on the seminal idea in Lee (1978) and 
developed by Brueckner and Follain (1988), which we augment to account for the panel structure of 
our data (1995-2003). We follow Papke and Wooldridge (2008) in developing a bivariate panel 
model with endogenous covariates and fixed effects. We provide a careful explanation of the 
econometric procedure used and address the standard errors issue. Thus, we contribute to the a 
relatively small empirical literature that deals with cross-sectional dependence in practice. First, we 
find that municipalities’ fiscal revenues are relevant to cooperation decision. A positive difference 
between the expected fiscal revenues of a cooperating locality and the actual revenues achieved by 
an isolated locality significantly increases the probability of joining an inter-municipal community. 
Conversely, if a municipality would receive a higher fiscal revenue by remaining (or becoming) 
isolated, the propensity of this locality to cooperate becomes negative. Second, our estimation 
results show that a municipality will be more inclined to cooperate if the neighboring municipalities 
are members of the inter-municipal jurisdiction.  
 
We believe that the issues raised by cooperation will contribute to the debate on the optimal 
                                                                                                                                                                  
French municipalities had less than 2,000 inhabitants, accounting for 25% of the metropolitan French population 
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organization of the public sector. Reorganization of sub-national jurisdictions is still on the political 
agenda in many countries. Our work seems to provide support for the idea that expected additional 
fiscal revenues provide a strong incentive to cooperate within an agglomeration. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses theoretical considerations related to 
cooperation decision based on cooperative game theory. The French institutional context and the 
wave of local cooperation are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 describes the empirical model and 
Section 5 presents the results of our estimations. Section 6 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Theoretical considerations related to cooperation decision 
 
We begin by presenting a simple representation of municipal government behavior in the 
decision to join a community or not. Our hypothesis is that forming a community can be analyzed 
by applying the concepts and tools of cooperative game theory developed by Shenoy (1979) and 
Hart and Kurz (1983) for the study of coalition formation. 
 
A cooperative game is defined by a set ܰ	 ൌ 	 ሼ1, … ݅, …݊ሽ of ݊ players (or municipalities) ݅ and 
a characteristic function v, which associates to each subset S of N a payoff value ݒሺݏሻ. We assume 
that this payoff can be assimilated to the fiscal revenues received by the municipality/player i in any 
subset S of N. We assume also a particular modeling of the behavior of the municipality/player. The 
literature proposes various ways to express the objectives of local governments, encompassing a 
wide range of possibilities, from benevolent maximizers of their citizens’ welfare (as e.g. in 
Wildasin, 1988) to self-seeking revenue maximizers (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980). For simplicity, 
we assume that municipal governments’ objective is to combine local residents’ utility from the 
consumption of local public goods and the rents accruing to policy-makers (as in Edwards and 
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Keen, 1996). As the levels of public services and rents are financed by total tax revenues, we 
suppose that a municipality/player i tries to maximize the level of total tax revenues, which is given 
by piBi where pi is the population of municipality i and Bi is per capita tax revenue. 
 
Shenoy (1979) and Hart and Kurz (1983) propose several conditions under which a stable 
partition of the players emerges, using different solution concepts to model the repartitioning of 
wealth among the players when a coalition forms. A partition P = (S1, .... St) is a collection of 
coalitions such that any player belongs to exactly one coalition in P ; Π is the set of all possible 
partitions. A payoff solution concept is a function ࡿ ∶ 	ߎ	 → 	2୉౤ ,  where 	2୉౤denotes the set of all 
susbsets of the Euclidian space ܧ௡. The payoff solution indicates the value received by player i in 
coalition ௜ܵ  when partition P forms. The main issue in this literature is identifying solution 
concepts that guaranty the stability of the partition. In other words, for a given allocation rule that 
reallocates the payoff  ݒሺݏሻ generated by the coalition S, we want the partition to be stable. No 
player or coalition of players has an incentive to deviate, that is, to quit the coalition and join 
another one.  
   
From game theory, we can derive some results that help our understanding of some key factors 
that favor the creation of a stable community. Individual rationality5 asserts that, within a coalition, 
the payoff received by a player should be superior or equal to the payoff she would receive as an 
individual. This is the simplest criterion that can be applied to explain the creation of a community. 
The growth of the total budget raised by the community must be high enough to reallocate fiscal 
revenues so that no player looses by joining the coalition. More formally, Shenoy proposes a 
sufficient condition for the formation of a grand coalition: 
 
                                                 
5 Shenoy and also Hart and Kurz study other payoff solution, such as the core, the Shapley value, the Von Neumann 
Morgenstern Stable sets, etc. which propose other disbursements to the players when a coalition forms.   
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Theorem (Shenoy 1979).  A game ሺܰ, ݒሻ  is super additive if: 
ଵܵ	 ∩ ܵଶ	 ൌ ∅	, ଵܵ, ܵଶ ∈ 	 2௡ 	→ 	ݒሺݏଵሻ ൅ 	ݒሺݏଶሻ 	൑ 		ݒሺݏଵ ൅	ݏଶሻ 
And strictly super additive if strict inequality always holds. If the game is strictly super additive, the 
grand coalition is stable for individually rational payoffs.  
 
In other words, a necessary condition for forming a grand coalition is that each additional player 
or coalition brings extra value to the union. Let us consider the simple case where there are two 
municipalities/players ଵܵ	 and ܵଶ, with population p1 and p2 respectively. B1 and B2 are their 
respective fiscal per capita revenues, with B1 > B2. We can associate the payoff value ݒሺݏଵሻ with the 
total fiscal revenues piBi of municipality 	ݏ௜ ሺ݅ ൌ 1,2ሻ. Cooperation between both municipalities, S1 
and S2, leading to coalition ሺݏଵ ൅	ݏଶሻ is possible only if: 
ݒሺSଵ ൅ Sଶሻ 	൐ ݒሺSଵሻ ൅ ݒሺSଶሻ, 
otherwise the stand alone option is an equivalent possibility. This implies 
ሺ݌ଵ ൅ ݌ଶሻܤଵଶ ൐ ݌ଵܤଵ ൅ ݌	ଶܤଶ 
ܤଵଶ ൐ ݌ଵ݌ଵ ൅ ݌ଶ ܤଵ ൅
݌ଶ
݌ଵ ൅ ݌ଶ ܤଶ 
 
where B12 is the fiscal revenue of the community per capita. The new p.c. revenue should always be 
superior to the average of previous revenues, which is technically impossible without new revenues. 
Hence, the only ways to make the game (strictly) super additive are to raise existing tax rates or to 
get sufficiently high value state grants to compensate the loss of revenue of some of the players.  
 
Cooperative game theory suggests that for cooperation to emerge, municipalities must 
achieve new fiscal revenue through i) higher rates on existing taxes or new taxes, and or ii) higher 
levels of existing state grants or new grants. To test this theoretical prediction, we exploit the 
characteristics of the French institutional setting and its existing experience in intergovernmental 
9 
 
cooperation. 
 
 
3. The institutional context 
 
In this section, we provide some information on the French local institutional context and 
the development of local government cooperation. 
  
The French local institutional context is characterized by three overlapping tiers of local 
government. The lowest tier consists of some 36,700 municipalities; the middle-tier consists of 96 
counties (or French “départements”); and the top tier consists of the 22 French regions. 
Municipalities are responsible for local urban services, buildings, provision of nurseries, primary 
schools, and sports facilities, and maintenance of municipal roads and urban public transport. 
Counties administer social assistance, and maintain county roads and middle schools. Regions are 
responsible for provision of vocational training, economic development, and building and 
maintenance of high schools. 
 
 Local revenues come mainly from taxation (54%), grants (23%) and borrowing. The local 
business tax (or "Taxe Professionnelle")6 is the major source of local government tax revenues, 
accounting for approximately 45% of the revenue derived from direct local taxes. The tax base 
consists mainly of capital goods and is based on the rental values of buildings, and of equipment 
(assumed to be 16% of the cost of the equipment). The remaining fiscal revenues are collected from 
households in the form of residential tax (“taxe d’habitation”), property tax (“taxe foncière sur le 
bâti”), and land tax (“taxe foncière sur le non bâti”). All municipalities receive a state grant, 
                                                 
6 This tax, which was related mainly to private capital, was removed in 2010 and replaced by a territorial economic 
contribution based on property and firm value added. 
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according to several criteria such as population and tax bases. 
 
 Since the beginning of the 1990s, several laws have been passed on local cooperation to 
solve the problem of “municipal fragmentation”.7 Based on the volunteer principle, neighboring 
municipalities that want to finance and manage some public services collectively are allowed to 
create, or join, an inter-municipal community (or EPCI).8 Local cooperation is expected to i) reduce 
local public spending by achieving  substantial economies of scale in the production of some local 
public goods such as public transport, cultural and sport facilities etc, and ii) limit fiscal and 
spending inequalities between member municipalities. This dual objective is financed by 
transferring some tax and spending powers from the municipalities to the corresponding inter-
municipal group.  
   
Local cooperation has been widely promoted by government based on financial incentives. 
Since 1999, the inter-municipal community has been awarded a new state grant9 (based mainly on 
community population and inter-municipal tax bases) and new tax revenues. It can apply an 
additional tax rate to the four municipal tax rates (business, residential, property and land taxes) or 
set a single business tax rate (SBT or “Taxe Professionnelle Unique”).10 If it chooses to set a SBT, 
                                                 
7 There are three main laws on the development of inter-municipalities in France: the law of 6th February 1992 which 
laid the basis for inter-municipal cooperation and was reinforced and simplified by the law of 12th July 1999, and the 
law of 13th August 2004 which rationalized the inter-municipal map.  
8 The inter-municipal community is managed by a board of delegates elected by member municipalities from their local 
councilors through an absolute majority. Therefore, unlike municipalities, “départements” or regions, inter-
municipal jurisdictions operate under indirect democracy and remain a decision making level rather than a strict 
administrative level. 
9 Note that this state grant attributed to the inter-municipal community coexists with the state grant attributed to the 
municipality. The latter is the same whether the locality cooperates or not. 
10 During the period of our study, there was a third – marginal – case, which was a mixed case where the community set 
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the municipality loses the right to set its own business tax rate but can still set the rate for the three 
remaining taxes (residential, property and land).  
 
As predicted by the theory (see Section 2), new fiscal revenues must be levied for 
cooperation to emerge voluntarily among a set of municipalities. In the French case, the community 
gets new fiscal revenues through i) a new tax rate (SBT) or an additional tax rate on business and ii) 
a new state grant. As a consequence, the residents of those municipalities often enjoy extra public 
output or better quality public services thanks to these new fiscal revenues. 
 
Although Map 1 reflects the reality that inter-municipal cooperation was a success during 1993 
and 2003, some municipalities remained isolated during the period studied. The more intuitive 
reason is that the obvious financial gains from cooperation and the provision of extra public goods 
are counterbalanced by the fact that each cooperating municipality loses some fiscal autonomy 
through devolution of competences and tax revenues to the community.11 By concluding a 
cooperative agreement with other localities, a relatively “rich” municipality loses control over part 
of its revenues which are redistributed among the entire community. Therefore, concluding a 
cooperative agreement with other municipalities might be a difficult choice for each individual 
municipality. Intergovernmental cooperation and the associated devolution of local competencies 
might lead to a lower level of public good provision within a cooperating locality. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
a single business tax rate and an additional tax rate on households. The community received double tax revenue 
from households and business while municipality i set a tax only on households. 
11 There might be some hidden coordination costs but by their nature they are difficult to measure. 
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MAP 1: Distribution of inter-municipal jurisdictions and their tax regimes 
 
   in 1993      in 2003 
 
 
Source: Charlot et al. (2012) 
 
4. Empirical Model 
 
To assess the trade-off between remaining isolated and cooperating, we argue that a 
municipality compares the level of fiscal revenues (i.e. tax revenues and state grants) raised to 
provide local public goods before and after joining an inter-municipal community. As argued in our 
theoretical section (Section 2), new fiscal revenues must be levied for cooperation to emerge 
voluntarily among a set of municipalities. In our case, the community gets new fiscal revenues 
through new tax revenues and a new state grant. Given that inter-municipal fiscal revenues (i.e. tax 
revenues levied by the community and state grant allocated to the community) are reallocated to 
citizens through the supply of joint public services in every cooperating municipality, the level of 
fiscal revenues accruing to each cooperating municipality must be carefully addressed.  
Additional business tax rate   (445)
Single business tax rate   (21)
Additional business tax rate   (1420)
Single business tax rate   (925)
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Hereafter, per capita fiscal revenues, that is the available revenue that can be used to finance the 
provision of both municipal and joint public goods, where appropriate, to every citizen, will be 
calculated as follows: 
- If municipality i remains isolated, its fiscal revenues p.c. raised to provide local public 
services will be formed by municipal tax revenues p.c. and state grant p.c. 
- If municipality i cooperates within a community, the available fiscal revenues p.c. raised to 
provide the whole range of public services (municipal and joint public services) will be 
formed by municipal tax revenues p.c., state grant p.c. allocated to municipality i, state grant 
p.c. allocated to inter-municipal group and inter-municipal tax revenues p.c. 
Appendix 1 provides more detail on this computation. 
 
Our aim is to determine whether the predicted difference (DIFFREV) between the two 
possible fiscal revenues, one based on the choice to remain isolated and one based on the choice to 
conclude an inter-municipal agreement has an impact on local governments’ cooperation decision 
(COOP). Given the peculiarity of our framework, we need to address the following issues.  
 
First, since our dependent variable (COOP) is a dichotomous variable (COOP=1 if the 
municipality cooperates and COOP=0 otherwise), we need to test a non-linear specification that 
acknowledges the bounded nature of the cooperation decision variable. Second, we expect that 
municipalities will take account of their expected fiscal revenues when joining an inter-municipal 
agreement; however fiscal revenues within a locality will depend on local intergovernmental 
agreement. Therefore, fiscal revenues are determined simultaneously with the decision to cooperate, 
which introduces endogeneity issues. Third, spatial spillover among municipalities might influence 
the choice to join an inter-municipal community. For several reasons explained in more detail 
below, it is likely that a municipality will be influenced by neighboring municipalities’ decisions to 
14 
 
cooperate (or not), which points to the need to include a spatial smoother among the regressors 
and/or to estimate appropriate robust cluster standard errors. Finally, one municipality may raise 
more revenue than some others due to the existence of a natural advantage in the form of natural 
resources, land, climate, historical importance, accumulated human capital or just its accumulated 
tax base. Any missing natural characteristic that influences the cooperation choice implying a 
change in revenues, will bias estimates of the tax revenue coefficient.12 To cope with unobserved 
fixed municipal characteristics, panel data are desirable. 
 
To sum up, we would suggest that the best estimation strategy is a non linear model which is 
robust to simultaneity with bounded decision making and spatial dependence among observations, 
and which has independent, and unobserved fixed municipal characteristics.  
 
 
4.1. Econometric issues 
 
Our novel econometric strategy is based on two different strands of the literature that deals 
with bivariate response models in the presence of endogenous covariates. The first draws on the 
seminal paper by Lee (1978) which proposes a simultaneous equation model for a limited 
dependent variable to estimate the effect of union membership on individual wages. More 
specifically, our strategy includes an extension to this methodology, as developed in Brueckner and 
Follain (1988).13 They model a mortgage choice equation in which the borrower faces an adjustable 
or fixed rate. In the mortgage case, the choice is made in combination with a decision on the rate 
type (fixed or adjustable). Only actual choices are observable in the data although the decision 
                                                 
12  An empirical proof of how much bias can occur in a spatial framework without fixed effects is given by Cassette et 
al. (2012) 
13 A similar strategy can be found in Rosenthal and Helsley (1994) where vacant rural land prices are estimated. 
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making process faced by the borrower involves counterfactual non-observable information i.e. the 
rate in the alternative choice. Similarly, as already argued, the cooperation choice made by local 
government is based on the predicted difference between the two possible fiscal revenues, one 
based on the choice to remain isolated and one based on the choice to conclude an inter-municipal 
agreement. We observe only actual choices (i.e. remaining isolated or cooperating, and associated 
fiscal revenues); therefore we need to implement a strategy that involves computation of a 
counterfactual tax revenue value, that is, the expected revenue in the alternative non-observed 
choice. Following Lee (1978), we estimate a counterfactual tax revenue earned by the local 
municipality in the alternative possible, non observed choice. This is achieved within the 
econometric structure of the model using observable characteristics. Once this counterfactual 
variable is computed, it is possible to obtain the difference (DIFFREV) between the predicted (non-
observed) fiscal revenue, and the actual fiscal revenue observed in the data.14 We apply this to each 
observation which allows us to examine how DIFFREV affects the propensity to join an inter-
municipal jurisdiction.  
  
To achieve our objective, we follow the four step procedure in Brueckner and Follain 
(1988). First, we estimate a probit model where the dependent variable is COOP and the fiscal 
revenue is omitted; the inverse Mills ratio is computed using the remaining observable 
characteristics. Second, we estimate two linear fiscal revenue equations, first on the subsample of 
observations that have joined an inter municipal group, and second on the subsample of isolated 
municipalities. We add to these equations the inverse Mills ratio from the first non-linear step, in 
order to deal with selectivity bias problems. Third, we predict fiscal revenues for each observation 
within the sample, using the coefficient estimate in the second step, and compute DIFFREV. 
                                                 
14 Let us mention that as in Lee (1978), the actual fiscal revenue is also re-estimated through the structural approach and 
used to compute DIFFREV. Therefore, DIFFREV is in fact indirectly computed using actual observed values. This 
will be clarified in the following econometric section. 
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Finally, from our procedure we derive a non linear model which includes DIFFREV. 
 
Due to our economic setting, unlike Lee (1978) and Brueckner and Follain (1988), we need 
to deal with unobserved heterogeneity. We allow unobserved time-constant municipal effects, which 
capture natural differences among localities, which are systematically related to municipal 
revenues. In so doing we follow Papke and Wooldridge’s (2008) contribute to the bivariate models 
literature, by deriving a structural bivariate response model with fixed effects and endogenous 
covariates. Intuitively, we nest Brueckner and Follain’s (1988) structural model15 within Papke and 
Wooldridge’s (2008) procedure. As suggested by the latter, we use the Mundlack-Chamberlain 
device (along with a Probit function and Gaussian error) to take account of fixed effects.  
 
In our setting, revenues may be correlated with time-varying unobservable characteristics 
and also municipal-level heterogeneity. Building a counterfactual a la Lee (1978), and computing 
differentials, should solve this problem. In any case, our procedure is sufficiently flexible to allow 
additional external instruments in both of the linear equations, note that they can be considered as 
exclusion restrictions, which may help to identify Lee procedures. Therefore we use the state grant 
allocated to municipalities as the excluded instrument in the fiscal revenues equations. Because of 
the four-step nature of this procedure, standard errors need to be adjusted regardless of the 
estimation method used; alternatively bootstrapping can be employed by re-sampling the cross-
sectional units. Following Papke and Wooldridge (2008), we rely on bootstrapping in our empirical 
work. All the stages and related specifics are described in the next subsection. 
 
  
                                                 
15 The term structural captures the fact that we estimate the counterfactual value within the econometric specification 
using observed characteristics only. 
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4.2. Econometric approach 
 
In the binary response contexts, the choice between logistic and probit conditional mean 
functions for the structural expectation is largely a matter of taste, although it is well established 
that the probit mean function has distinct advantages in relation to coping with the endogenous 
explanatory variables (Papke and Wooldridge 2008). Our econometric approach is as follows. 
 Under a non linear formulation (probit), fiscal cooperation choice is based on an index of 
the form: 
               ߗ௜,௧ 	ൌ 	ߚ	ܺ’௜,௧ 	൅ 	ߟ௜ െ	݁௜,௧          (1) 
where 	 ௜ܺ,௧ is a matrix of the explanatory variables (discussed in detail in the next section) for 
observation i at time t, ߚ is a coefficient vector, and ݁௜,௧ is a standard normal error term. 
Cooperation is chosen when ߗ௜,௧ ൐ 	0, alternatively we are in the isolation case, ߟ௜ are time 
invariant effects that in our case are represented by Mundlack devices. 
We start from a reduced form probit equation: 
      ߗ௜,௧ ൌ 	α ܼ′௜,௧ ൅ 	ߟ௜ െ	ݓ௜,௧                    (2) 
where ܼ௜,௧ is a matrix that contains all the covariates appearing in 	 ௜ܺ,௧ but not DIFFREV, ߟ௜ are 
Mundlack devices and ݓ௜,௧  is the idiosyncratic error term. Computing ߙො from (2) we can create the 
selectivity bias variables SBC and SBI as:16 
SBC	 ൌ 	ϕሺZ’ߙොሻ	/	ΦሺZ’ߙොሻ ;  SBI	 ൌ 	ϕሺZ’ߙොሻ	/	ሺ1	 െ 	ΦሺZ’ߙොሻሻ  
These are two Mill’s ratios that have to be added in the following linear equations (3a) and (3b), to 
be noticed that we are in panel fixed effect setting, therefore it is advisable to compute SBC and SBI	 
in more than one step, the better way to proceed regressing (2) for each time period and then to 
construct the vectors SBC, SBI (Wooldridge, 1995):  
  REVCOOP୧,୲ ൌ 		 λ௖௢௢௣	ܺ’௜,௧ 		൅ 	ܵܤܥ௜,௧ 	൅ 	ܫ௜,௧ 	൅ 	ߨ௜ െ	݇௜,௧  (3a) 
                                                 
16 SBC is selectivity bias cooperation; SBI is selectivity bias isolated.  
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This regression is made just on the subsample of municipalities that cooperate, REVCOOP୧,୲ is the 
tax revenues per capita and SBC is an appropriate inverse Mill’s ratio from (2).  
 
  REVISO୧,୲ ൌ 		 λ௜௦௢	ܺ’௜,௧ 		൅ 	ܵܤܫ௜,௧ 	൅ 	 ܫ௜,௧ 	൅ 	ߨ௜ െ	݇௜,௧       (3b) 
This regression is estimated only on the subsample of municipalities that remain isolated, REVISO୧,୲ 
is the tax revenues and ܵܤܫ is an appropriate inverse Mill’s ratio from (2). ܫ௜,௧ is our excluded 
instrument (municipal grant) which we consider is correlated with revenues but independent of the 
choice to cooperate (see the next section), ߨ௜ are fixed effect and ݇௜,௧ the idiosyncratic error term.   
 
We can then compute:  
	ܦܫܨܨܴܧ ௜ܸ,௧ ൌ 	REVCOOPన,୲෣ 	െ		REVISOన,୲෣      (4)  
 
Finally we regress Equation (1) as in Papke and Wooldridge (2008) adding ܦܫܨܨܴܧ ௜ܸ,௧ to ܼ௜,௧ 
obtaining ௜ܺ,௧ , and bootstrap the whole procedure in order to obtain robust errors. In particular, we 
use a block bootstrap and resample over counties (“département”), in order to get cluster standard 
errors, which is recommended in our case. We are aware that in an economic setting of this kind 
observation could not considered i.i.d.  
 
To check the robustness of our econometric strategy, we estimate an alternative approach: a 
conditional logistic model with fixed effects, with the dependent variable COOP. In this alternative 
specification, we use the same covariates but substitute ܦܫܨܨܴܧ ௜ܸ,௧ by the variable 
ܦܫܨܨܤܹܶܥܱܷܰ ௜ܶ,௧, which is the difference between the actual values of the revenues for 
municipality i and a counterfactual value. We calculate this counterfactual value using the average 
fiscal revenue of those municipalities belonging to the same county (or “département”), that made 
the opposite choice made in i. 
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More specifically, if s denotes neighboring municipalities in the same county, DIFFBTWCOUNT௜ is 
computed as follows: 
 If i is isolated, 	DIFFBTWCOUNT௜ ൌ 	Eሺܴܧ ௜ܸ െ s	|	COOP ൌ 1ሻ െ ܴܧ ௜ܸ 
 Otherwise, if i cooperates,	DIFFBTWCOUNT௜ ൌ 		ܴܧ ௜ܸ െ Eሺܴܧ ௜ܸ	|	COOP ൌ 0ሻ  
In order to avoid simultaneity problems, tax differentials are one period time lagged.  
 
4.3. Covariates and instruments 
 
Given the nature of our spatial framework, we rely on specific covariates. Fiscal revenues 
(explained in Appendix 1) - our main variable of interest - is a complicated linear combination of 
different tax bases, different tax rates, municipal and inter-municipal grants. To avoid collinearity, 
we choose to focus on the broad value of fiscal revenues.  
 
Since fiscal revenues may be correlated with time-varying unobservable characteristics, we 
need to find an appropriate instrument. Following Papke (2005) and Papke and Wooldridge (2008), 
we identified the state grant allocated to municipalities as an appropriate instrument since it forms 
part of the local revenues always levied by the municipality regardless of the decision to cooperate 
or not. This leads to Eሺܫ௜,௧|	݁௜,௧ሻ ൌ 0 and ensures a positive correlation between ܫ௜,௧Iand  ܼ௜,௧. 
 
As already discussed, we include another explanatory variable as a spatial smoother, that is, 
the share of localities that cooperate within the same county (“département”). Since cooperation 
decision is strongly dependent on what neighbors decide, we expect a positive sign on the parameter 
associated with this variable. By law, an inter-municipal community must include contiguous 
localities. If no neighbors cooperate, the probability of joining an inter-municipal community will 
be lower than if close neighbors already cooperate. Moreover, we can expect some mimicking 
behavior from local officials in terms of cooperation, on the grounds that it may be stigmatizing to 
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remain isolated when most neighboring localities have signed an intergovernmental agreement. 
Citizens/voters may become aware of new public services provided by a community (e.g. public 
transport, cultural and sports facilities) and may put pressure on their local government to join the 
community.17 Officials might be aware also that remaining isolated from an existing close 
community (which provides a range of good public services to firms and households) could lead to 
capital flight from the territory. Tax base mobility can explain the propensity of officials to imitate 
the cooperation decisions of neighbors.18 It is likely also that municipalities, when deciding whether 
or not to cooperate, will mimic neighbors’ behavior following the trend suggested by Manski 
(1993). We can expect also that information on cooperation (expected revenues, expected state 
grant, etc,) will be more easily obtained by an isolated municipality that is located next to a group of 
cooperating municipalities. Mimicking behavior related to cooperation is likely to be observed in 
this context. The literature on local fiscal decision-making provides extensive developments on this 
kind of spatial spillover and its identification (Brueckner, 2003). Since we need a spatial smoother, 
we compute the share of municipalities, within the same county, that have made the decision to join 
an inter-municipal community.19 Since, by definition, a previous decision to cooperate in a 
neighboring municipality is exogenous, we lag this variable by one period with respect to our 
dependent variable.20  
 
Finally, drawing on the literature on local public finance, we include some socio-economic 
characteristics of the municipalities: 
                                                 
17 The argument is similar to yardstick competition models (Salmon, 1987; Besley and Case, 1995) where incumbents 
imitate the public decisions of their neighbors to stand for reelection. 
18 This is a tax competition argument. 
19 An alternative approach would be to find appropriate instruments to cope with this new endogeneity problem. Future 
research should address this problem. 
20 Di Porto and Revelli (2011) show that a time lagged spatial smoother can be considered a valid predictor of the actual 
spatial smoother and using one or other does not lead to hugely biased estimates of spatial spillover. 
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- municipal population and population density. Their respective expected sign is ambiguous. 
First, we can expect a positive sign since the larger the population of the municipality, the 
greater will be local public needs and the public goods spillovers on the neighboring 
localities. In order to reduce free riding behavior from citizens who do not live in a city but 
benefit from its public good provision, the municipality will have an incentive to share or to 
transfer some competences and the associated supply of services, to the inter-municipal 
group. Second, we could also expect a negative sign given that bigger municipalities, which 
are usually richer cities, do not need to collaborate to deliver public services. 
- the unemployment percentage and the share of people in the municipality i who are more 
than 60 years old. The expected impact of these variables on the probability to cooperate are 
positive. If existence of a community is seen as a solution to sharing or transferring the 
supply of specific services to these categories of the population, we should observe a 
positive impact.  
 
Although local politics is an important issue in empirical work on consolidation within Northern 
European countries (Sorensen, 2006; Saarima and Tukiainen, 2010; Moisio, 2012), for various 
reasons, we do not include any political variables. For example, since more than 80% of our 
municipalities are very small (less than 2,000 inhabitants), many French mayors do not have 
political affiliations and do not want to be associated with a particular political party. Moreover, 
unlike the situation in Finland following a merger, the French municipalities continue to exist as 
entities after joining an inter-municipal body, and there are political consequences of cooperation in 
the French case. However, there is no doubt that the political affiliation of the elected president of 
the inter-municipal council (elected by members of the inter-municipal council former members of 
participating municipal councils) can have an impact on the decision of an isolated municipality to 
join. A positive decision to join a community will be more likely if the president of the inter-
municipal council belongs to the ruling party in the municipality. Unfortunately, we cannot test this 
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hypothesis. 
 
Data sources are presented in Appendix 2 and summary statistics in Table 1 in Appendix 2. 
 
5. Results 
 
Estimation results  of the fiscal revenues equations are shown in Table 2.  
 
TABLE 2. Structural Bivariate Response Model and Conditional Logistic Regression 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Structural bivariate   Structural bivariate   Conditional 
COOP response model response model fixed effect logistic  
  without fixed effect with fixed effect model 
  (1) (2) (3) 
    
DIFFREV -6.501***    70.839***     
 (.856) (12.988)  
DIFFBTWCOUNT (t-1)   4.754***    
   (.484) 
Share coop. in department (t-1) 2.084***    3.134*** 1.287**    
 (.112) (0.401) (.674) 
Unemployment (%) 4.015*** -24.507*** 16.106 
 (1.084) (8.406) (14.628) 
Population  -.000***    -.001***    -.001*    
 (3.90e-06) (.0001) (.000) 
Density .000***    .000***    .000    
 (.000) (0.000) (.000) 
Old pop. (%)  -1.850***    -11.689***  .742    
 (.277) (6.025.) -7.757 
Year dummies YES YES YES 
FE NO YES YES 
obs.  202,146 202,146  202,146 
Note: for every model we report coefficients and standard error. Model (1) and (2) show bootstrapped standard errors, 300 replications  
were performed, model (3) report robust standard errors 
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The inverse Mill ratio coefficients in Table 2 (SBC for cooperating localities in column 1 
and SBI for isolated localities in column 2) both exhibit a positive sign. As stated by Lee (1978), the 
selection effect needs not to be positive or negative. Moreover, in a panel case, it is difficult to 
theoretically predetermine the sign of the selectivity parameters. 
 
In Table 3, columns 1 and 2 present the estimation results of the structural bivariate response model 
without and with effects respectively.21 The estimation results of the conditional fixed effects 
logistic model are presented in column 3.  
 
TABLE 3. Fiscal Revenues Equations 
                                                 
21 For simplicity, we do not comment on the estimation results shown in column 1 since fixed effects need to be taken 
into account. 
Dependent variable: Fiscal revenues   Fiscal revenues   
Fiscal revenues p.c. equation equation 
  cooperative municipalities  isolated municipalities
  (1) (2) 
   
Unemployment (%) 1.067***    0.420*** 
 (0.133) (0.092) 
Population  .000**    6.23e-07 
 (3.48e-06) (8.92e-06) 
Density -.000**    -.000**    
 (4.64e-07) (1.93e-07) 
Old pop. (%) 0.667***    0.343***  
 (0.088) (0.045) 
SBC 0.029***  
 (0.005)  
SBI  0.029*** 
  (0.001) 
I 0.000*** -3.78e-06 
 6.38e-06 (4.11e-06) 
year dummies YES YES 
FE FE YES 
obs.  112,098 118,050 
Note: for every model we report coefficients and standard error
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Column (2) shows that the parameter associated with DIFFREV is strongly significant and 
positive, suggesting that municipality fiscal revenues are relevant for the cooperation decision. 
However, to understand this positive sign, we should consider two possible alternative cases based 
on the sign of DIFFREV.  
 
Let us first consider the case where the value of DIFFREV is positive, meaning that deriving 
from Equation (4), a municipality receive (or could receive) a higher fiscal revenue within an inter-
municipal jurisdiction. The positive sign of the parameter of DIFFREV confirms that this 
municipality has a positive probability to join (or to remain a member of) an inter-municipal 
jurisdiction. Therefore, we confirm that a positive difference between the expected fiscal revenues 
raised by a cooperating locality and the actual revenues of an isolated locality significantly 
increases the probability to join an inter-municipal community. Moreover, a cooperating 
municipality, which predicts that its fiscal revenue will fall if it leaves the community, will have a 
higher probability of staying a member of the inter-municipal jurisdiction. Most municipalities 
probably see inter-municipal cooperation as an efficient solution to increasing fiscal revenues and 
improving the quality and completeness of the supply of public services to their residents. 
 
Conversely, if the value of DIFFREV is negative, i.e. when a municipality gets a higher 
fiscal revenue by remaining (or becoming) isolated, the propensity of this locality to cooperate 
becomes negative. This outcome perfectly explains why a rich isolated locality will have a lower 
incentive to conclude an inter-municipal agreement with its relatively poorer neighbors. We confirm 
that when cooperation is welfare enhancing for a set of localities (through new financial incentives) 
but leads to losses for one “rich” municipality (due to the transfer of previous achieved tax revenues 
to the inter-municipal level) it is unlikely that this locality will cooperate. 
 
25 
 
The estimation results for the conditional fixed effects logistic model (column 3) confirm the 
robustness of this outcome since we have a positive coefficient of DIFFBTWCOUNT. Higher 
(corresp. lower) fiscal revenues p.c. raised through cooperation significantly increase (corresp. 
decrease) the probability to conclude an agreement.  
 
Next, we turn to interpretation of the parameter for the impact of neighbors’ cooperation 
behavior on the decision-making behavior of local officials; this has a highly significant positive 
sign. As expected, this suggests that the cooperation choice of neighboring municipalities is 
extremely relevant for the cooperation decision. A municipality will be more inclined to join an 
existing community if its neighbors have already joined an inter-municipal jurisdiction.  
 
As explained in subsection 4.3, there are many possible explanations for this result. Given 
that it might be stigmatizing to remain isolated when most neighboring localities have concluded an 
intergovernmental agreement, local officials may adopt some form of mimicking behavior related to 
cooperation. As argued in the yardstick competition literature (Salmon, 1987; Besley and Case, 
1995), citizens/voters may be aware of additional public services provided within a close 
community and may put pressure on their authority to join a community. A tax competition 
argument based on potential mobility of the tax base might also explain this propensity to be 
influenced by the decisions of neighbors. Officials are aware that staying outside an existing 
community that provides a high level of public services to firms and households might lead to 
capital flight from the territory.  
 
Finally, the remaining covariates based on socio-demographic characteristics have the 
expected positive signs for the parameter associated with density (although not significant in 
column 3), suggesting that high population density may be an incentive for the municipality to 
transfer some competencies to the community level in order to achieve the expected economies of 
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scale in the provision of public goods. Moreover, in order to reduce free riding behavior from 
citizens who do not live in a city but benefit from its public good provision, the municipality may 
have an incentive to share or to transfer some competences and the associated supply of services, to 
the inter-municipal group. Finally, somewhat surprisingly, the respective coefficient of the 
population variable, unemployment and share of old people, is negative or not significant. In all 
cases, we cannot reject the possibility that endogeneity may be biasing the estimation results. 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
Cooperation among local governments has been encouraged to enable the aggregation of resources 
and improved public sector efficiency. However, if cooperation through the joint delivery of local 
public services is likely to be welfare enhancing for the agglomeration, but will lead to losses for 
one of the parties, it is unlikely that the losing municipality will cooperate voluntarily. Inter-
governmental cooperation involving municipalities administering some local public services is 
likely to imply new state grants and tax revenues. This paper explores the role of fiscal revenues in 
the decisions of local authorities to cooperate. We discuss some theoretical considerations related to 
local cooperation decision from cooperative game theory. Next, using a unique panel dataset of 
30,000 French municipalities for 1995-2003, we estimate the relationship between cooperation 
decision-making and fiscal revenues. Due to the particularity of our economic framework, we 
employ a non-linear estimation with fixed effects and endogenous covariates to develop a novel 
applied econometric strategy. Thus, we contribute to the very small literature that deals with cross 
sectional dependence in practice. We find evidence that municipalities’ fiscal revenues are relevant 
to cooperation decision. A positive difference between the expected fiscal revenues of a cooperating 
locality and the actual revenues realized by an isolated locality significantly increases the 
probability of joining an inter-municipal community. Conversely, if the municipality would receive 
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a higher fiscal revenue by remaining (or becoming) isolated, the propensity of this locality to 
cooperate becomes negative. Finally, our estimation results show that a municipality will be more 
likely to cooperate if the neighboring municipalities are members of the inter-municipal 
jurisdiction.  
   
However, further research should be done to enhance our understanding of the determinants 
of fiscal cooperation. Cooperation is a complex process involving different levels of cooperative 
behavior. In the French context, municipalities can opt for a single business tax regime, an 
additional tax regime or a mix of the two. The determinants of each choice may differ and require 
investigation. 
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Appendix 1. Fiscal Revenues 
 
In this appendix, we try to explain to what extent, in the French case, municipal fiscal revenues are 
modified once the local authority has concluded a cooperation agreement. These revenues depend 
on the tax regime which has been chosen by the community (single business taxation or additional 
taxation). When a municipality is isolated, it receives a state grant, based on several criteria (but 
mainly population). When a municipality enters an inter-municipal community, it still receives the 
same central grant (to the same amount as long as municipal population remains the same) but the 
community receives an extra state grant to supply joint local public services.22 In what follows, for 
the sake of simplicity, we assume that all municipalities that are part of the same community, 
receive the same per capita proportions of this state grant.   
                                                 
22 This extra central grant is also based mostly on population (within the community) and also on the number of 
competencies delegated by municipalities to the inter-municipal government, and is paid annually as long as the 
inter-municipal community exists. 
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If a municipality is not part of a cooperation agreement as described above, we denote tim, as 
the tax revenues on households in municipality i, Tim the business tax revenues in municipality i, gim 
the state grant for municipality i, pim the population in locality i. Then the municipal fiscal revenue 
p.c. can be written: 
Bim=(tim+Tim+gim)/pi           (1) 
 
If the municipality i has joined an inter-municipal group I, which has chosen an additional 
tax regime (both levels of government set a business tax rate on the same tax base), its potential 
fiscal revenue p.c. becomes: 
Bim’= (tim’+Tim’+gim)/pi+ (tia +TIa+GIa)/pI        (2) 
where TIa is the local business tax revenue raised by the community I, GIa the state grant attributed 
to the community I and pI the population in community I.  The community now has a formal source 
of tax revenue with (tia +TIa+GIa). For the isolated cases, there may be variations in the business tax 
revenue and the household tax revenue raised by the municipality. We denote these new revenues 
tim’+Tim’. Let Rim’ be the amount of tax revenues raised within municipality i for its own budget, and  
RI’  the amount of fiscal revenues raised within municipality i for the community’s budget. 
Assuming that the benefits of cooperation are equally distributed among community members, the 
potential fiscal revenue p.c. can be rewritten as  
Bim’ = Rim’/pi +RI’/pI     (3) 
 
If the municipality i has joined a community with a single business tax rate (where the 
municipality no longer sets a business tax rate), its potential fiscal revenue can be written: 
Bim”= (tim”+gim)/pi+ (TIs+GIs)/pI   (4) 
where TIs is the local business tax revenue raised by the community I, GIa the state grant attributed 
to the community I and pI the population in community I. The community now has a formal source 
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of tax revenue with (TIs+GIs). With regard to the isolated cases, the only possibility is for the 
municipality to tax households only. We denote these new revenues by tim”. Let Rim” be the amount of 
tax revenues raised within municipality i for its own budget, and  RI”  the amount of fiscal revenues 
raised within municipality i for the community’s budget. Assuming that the benefits of the 
cooperation are equally distributed among community’s members, the potential tax revenue p.c. can 
be rewritten as23  
Bim” = Rim”/pi +RI”/pI     (5) 
 
 
APPENDIX 2. Data 
 
Our dataset includes 36203 municipalities observed over 8 years (1995-2003). Our dataset is 
a balanced panel. For convenience, we develop our regressions excluding the municipality of Paris 
which is a clear outlier, and the Corsican municipalities for which a spatial matrix (W) is difficult to 
construct.  
Fiscal data are from the Direction Générale des Collectivités Locales (DGCL, Ministère de 
l’Intérieur) and were provided by INRA-CESAER (Dijon). The remaining control variables are 
taken from the Centre Maurice Halbwachs. 
Table 1 shows summary statistics, mean standard deviation and maximum of the main 
covariates used in the regressions 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 There is a third marginal case – a mixed case- where the community raises a single business tax rate TIs and an 
additional tax rate on households tIs . The community gets double tax revenue on households and business (tIs +TIs+GIs) 
while the municipality i only sets a tax on households. The municipal tax revenue can be written as Bim’”= 
(tim’”+gim)/pi+ (tIs +TIs+GIs)/pI =Rim’”/pi +RI”’/pI 
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TABLE 1. Summary statistics  
 
1995-2002 COOP Fiscal 
Revenues 
p.c. 
Unemployment 
% 
Population Density Old 
People 
% 
Mean  .483 .254 .043 1766.253 823.776 .235 
Standard 
deviation 
.499 .314 .019 8097.353 3988.969 .081 
Minimum 0 0 0 5.014 .364 0 
Maximum 1 12.552 .333 455134 199163.9  .999 
 
 
